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MASSACHUSETTS' REJECTION OF 

OREGON v. ELSTAD FOR 

SUPPRESSION OF WARNED STATEMENTS 

MADE AFTER A MIRANDA VIOLATION 

KATHERINE E. McMAHON* 
INTRODUCTION** 
Central to our system of federalism is the concept that the 
United States Supreme Court stands as the final interpreter of the 
United States Constitution.1 While 
a State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restric­
tions on police activity than those [the United States Supreme] 
Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional stan­
dards2[,] •.• a State may not impose such greater restrictions as a 
matter of federal constitutional law when [the Supreme] Court 
* Assistant District Attorney for the Suffolk District of Massachusetts, Chief of 
the Appellate Division and Director of Superior Court Training. Associate Editor, 
1997-98, Massachusetts Law Review; Managing Editor, 1981-82, Western New England 
Law Review; J.D., cum laude, Western New England College School of Law; B.A., cum 
laude, Fairfield University. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect those of the Office of the District Attorney for the Suffolk 
District. 
** Parallel citations have been added to this article for the convenience of 
Massachusetts' practitioners. 
1. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 360 n.12 (1970) (Harlan, J., concur­
ring) (stating that the United States Supreme Court, not the United States Congress, 
bears the paramount responsibility of construing the United States Constitution); 
Dixon v. Duffy, 344 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1952) (stating that the United States Supreme 
Court is the "ultimate arbiter" of this question: whether a state prisoner had been de­
prived of his federal constitutional rights, and adding that the Court will review a state 
court decision unless it rests upon an independent state ground); see also U.S. CONST. 
art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under their Authorit[ies] ...."). 
2. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (citations omitted); accord Attorney 
General v. Colleton, 387 Mass. 790, 796, 444 N.E.2d 915, 919 (1982). 
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specifically refrains from imposing them.3 
Principles of federalism dictate that, when the United States 
Supreme Court has defined the contours of law enforcement con­
duct, the several states must adhere to those precepts when apply­
ing federal law.4 
Historically, the Supreme Court has recognized that the "state 
courts are the ultimate expositors of state law ... except in extreme 
circumstances."5 The Court has further realized that it is the "very 
essence of our federalism' that the States should have the widest 
latitude in the administration of their own systems of criminal jus­
tice."6 Nonetheless, the Court has long employed the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution to extend federal 
constitutional rights to defendants in state criminal cases.? 
The Fourteenth Amendment has been the vehicle by which the 
Supreme Court has evaluated the voluntariness of confessions in 
3. Hass, 420 U.S. at 719 (footnote & citations omitted) (rejecting the defendant's 
contention that Oregon constitutional principles applied to the question which had 
been briefed and argued under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution); accord Fare v. Michael c., 442 U.S. 707, 717 (1979) (rejecting the 
California Supreme Court's extension of request for counsel to a juvenile's request for a 
probation officer during custodial interrogation). 
4. See, e.g., Hass, 420 U.S. at 719 (Hass argued that since Oregon's own law was 
more restrictive than federal law, the Supreme Court could not compel it to conform to 
federal law; since the case involved question of federal, not state law, the state court 
could not impose greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law than those 
enunciated by the Supreme Court); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60-61 (1968) (stat­
ing that while the State of New York is free to develop its own state law, it could not 
tread on protections enunciated in the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution). . 
5. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684,691 (1975) (emphasis added); accord Com­
monwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 530, 350 N.E.2d 444, 454 (1976). 
6. Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 468 (1958), overruled in part by Ashe v. 
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970); accord Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504, 510 (1958), over­
ruled in part by Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). "It goes without saying that 
preventing and dealing with crime is much more the business of the States than it is of 
the Federal Government ... and that we should not lightly construe the Constitution so 
as to intrude upon the administration of justice by the individual States." Patterson v. 
New York, 432 U.S. 197,201 (1977). 
7. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969) (holding that the double 
jeopardy protections of the Fifth Amendment applied to the states through the Four­
teenth Amendment); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (holding that the Fifth 
Amendment self-incrimination protections extended to the states via the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963) (holding that the right 
to counsel under the Sixth Amendment extended to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-67, 660 (1961) (the search and seizure 
protections found in the Fourth Amendment applied to the states through the Four­
teenth Amendment). 
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state prosecutions,S and the Court has ruled that involuntary state­
ments are inadmissible in evidence in state criminal trials.9 Further, 
in Miranda v. Arizona,lO the Court applied the self-incrimination 
protections found within the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution to the states, via the Fourteenth Amendment, and es­
tablished a rule excluding from evidence statements taken in viola­
tion of the Miranda warnings.ll If police officers obtain a 
statement without administering the Miranda warnings, a per se 
rule of exclusion bars the statement from evidence, for the state­
ment presumably is tainted by the inherently coercive atmosphere 
of custodial interrogation.12 
Some courts, including the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court ("SJC"), use federal tests for voluntariness-the "cat-out-of­
the-bag" and the "break-in-the-stream-of -events" analyses13-to 
resolve the question of the admissibility in evidence of a properly 
warned statement after an initial Miranda violation, extending Mi­
randa's per se rule of exclusion to the latter statement.14 These 
courts presume that the Miranda violation taints the later 
statement.15 
8. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321 n.2, 320-22 (1959); Brown v. Missis­
sippi, 297 U.S. 278,279,285-86 (1936); see also infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text. 
9. See, e.g., Spano, 360 U.S. at 321,323-24 (the defendant's will was overborne by 
official pressure, his fatigue, and false sympathy; patent intent by police officers to ex­
tract a confession from him; statement suppressed, and conviction reversed); Ashcraft 
v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143,153-54 (1944) (the defendant was held incommunicado for 
thirty-six hours, not allowed to sleep or rest, and questioned without any respite; state­
ment should have been suppressed; conviction reversed). 
10. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
11. See id. at 467; see also infra notes 49-59 and accompanying text. The Miranda 
warnings include: the right to remain silent; the right to have counsel present at ques­
tioning; the right to have counsel appointed if the detainee cannot afford one; and the 
caveat that anything the detainee says can be used against him in court. See Miranda, 
384 U.S. at 467-71. 
12. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,306-07 (1985); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
13. See infra notes 60-72 and accompanying text. The "break-in-the-stream-of­
events" test looks to whether there has been a break in the causal connection between 
the initial coercion, reSUlting in the first statement, and the second statement. See EL­
stad, 470 U.S. at 305-06; Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690 (1982). The "cat-out-of­
the-bag" test considers whether the suspect believes that, by giving the first statement, 
he has spilled the proverbial beans and has no choice but to give a second statement. 
See United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1947); Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 
Mass. 662, 686, 335 N.E.2d 660, 675 (1975). 
14. See infra notes 88-135 and accompanying text for the SJC's treatment of these 
issues. 
15. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 317-18 (noting that a "handful of courts" used 
Supreme Court precedents concerning coerced confessions on the question of Miranda 
violations); Commonwealth v. Smith, 412 Mass. 823, 829, 593 N.E.2d 1288, 1291-92 
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In Oregon v. Elstad,16 however, the Supreme Court rejected 
the notion of a presumptive taint and explained that the "cat-out­
of-the-bag" and the "break-in-the-stream-of-events" tests apply 
only to the question of voluntariness, not to the effect of an initial 
Miranda violation on the admissibility in evidence of a later, prop­
erly warned statementP The Supreme Court limited Miranda's 
presumption of taint to the initial unwarned statement, noting that 
the per se exclusionary rule bars the statement from evidence even. 
if it is made voluntarily. IS The Elstad Court declared that if the 
first, unwarned statement is voluntary, a second, properly warned 
statement is admissible in evidence if it, too, is voluntary.19 The 
Court concluded that the proper administration of Miranda warn­
ings should cure the condition which renders the first, voluntary 
statement inadmissible and allow admission in evidence of the sec­
ond, warned statement.20 
Even when the Supreme Court has spoken on a matter of fed­
eral constitutional law, as in Elstad, a state still can impose constric­
tions of its own design on police activity under its own state law.21 
In recent years, the Massachusetts SJC has turned repeatedly to the 
Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts22 when it has viewed federal constitutional rules as 
too restrictive of citizens' rights.23 This resort to state constitutional 
(1992) (holding that an admission made in violation of Miranda is presumed to taint 
latter statements, and the provision of the Miranda warnings alone are insufficient to 
cure the taint); see also infra note 136 and cases cited therein. 
16. 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
17. See id. at 318. 
18. See id. at 307. 
19. See id. at 317-18; see also infra notes 163-74 and accompanying text. 
20. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310-11. 
21. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1967); Commonwealth v. 
Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 530, 350 N.E.2d 444, 454-55 (1976). 
22. See MASS. CONST. part 1, art. 1-30 (composing the Declaration of Rights of 
the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts). 
23. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Martinez, 425 Mass. 382, 388, 681 N.E.2d 818, 823 
(1997) (stating that the right to conflict-free counsel under Article Twelve of the Massa­
chusetts Declaration of Rights does not require a showing of prejudice if an actual 
conflict exists, in contrast to the test under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution recited in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980»; Commonwealth v. 
Amirault, 424 Mass. 618, 631, 677 N.E.2d 652, 662 (1997) (companion cases) (noting 
that the confrontation right under Article Twelve is more specific than that under the 
Sixth Amendment, requiring face-to-face confrontation between a criminal defendant 
and the witnesses at trial); Commonwealth v. Stoute, 422 Mass. 782, 785-86, 665 N.E.2d 
93,95-96 (1996) (rejecting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), and following 
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), to determine what constitutes a 
seizure under Article Fourteen of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights); Common­
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protections is a trend which has been seized upon by other jurisdic­
tions.24 On occasion, the SJC also has turned to Massachusetts 
common law.25 The self-incrimination prophylactics established in 
wealth v. Johnson, 420 Mass. 458, 462, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1259-60 (1995) (holding that if 
out-of-court identification is unduly suggestive, it must be suppressed, and any other 
identifications are admissible only if the prosecution proves that they stem from an 
independent source; rejecting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977), as the test 
under Article Twelve); Commonwealth v. Urena, 417 Mass. 692, 695-96, 632 N.E.2d 
1200, 1202-03 (1994) (utilizing state test for ineffective assistance of counsel, as it 
deemed Article 1\velve more protective of a criminal defendant than the Sixth Amend­
ment); Jenkins v. Chief Justice, 416 Mass. 221, 232-33, 619 N.E.2d 324, 332 (1993) (hold­
ing that although under federal system pretrial detention of up to forty-eight hours is 
constitutional, per County ofRiverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991), no more than 
twenty-four hours is permitted under Article Fourteen); Opinions of the Justices, 412 
Mass. 1201, 1210, 591 N.E.2d 1073, 1078 (1992) (stating that an arrestee's refusal to 
submit to a breath or blood-alcohol test is inadmissible in evidence under Article 
1\velve, although admissible under the Fifth Amendment, per South Dakota v. Neville, 
459 U.S. 553 (1983)); Guiney v. Police Comm'r, 411 Mass. 328,333-34,582 N.E.2d 523, 
526 (1991) (random urinalysis of police officers is contrary to Article Fourteen's protec­
tions against unreasonable searches, although not apparently a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, under Guiney v. Roache, 873 F.2d 1557 (1st Cir. 1989)); Commonwealth 
v. Amendola, 406 Mass. 592,600-01,550 N.E.2d 121, 126 (1990) (rejecting United States 
v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980), and upholding automatic standing to challenge searches 
under Article Fourteen); Commonwealth v. Blood, 400 Mass. 61, 67-69, 507 N.E.2d 
1029, 1032-33 (1987) (companion cases) (warrantless interception by law enforcement 
agents of conversation with one party's consent permitted under Fourth Amendment, 
per United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979), but a warrant is required, even with 
one party's consent, under Article Fourteen); Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 
374-75,476 N.E.2d 548, 556-57 (1985) (rejection of federal totality of the circumstances 
test for probable cause enunciated in lllinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), in favor of 
obsolete federal test set forth in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. 
United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), under Article Fourteen). See generally Charles H. 
Baron, The Supreme Judicial Court in its Fourth Century: Meeting the Challenge of the 
"New Constitutional Revolution," 77 MAss. L. REv. 35, 35-36, 38-43 (1992); Herbert P. 
Wilkins, Judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights in Relation to 
Cognate Provisions of the United States Constitution, 14 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 887, 921­
28 (1980). 
24. See, e.g., People v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1099, 1114 (Cal. 1975) (holding that 
full body search is permitted under state constitution only for the limited purpose of 
finding weapons, in contrast to United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)); State v. 
Santiago, 492 P.2d 657, 664 (Haw. 1971) (rejecting Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 
(1971), under state constitution); State v. Collins, 297 A.2d 620, 624 (Me. 1972) 
(although the United States Supreme Court in Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972), 
said that prosecution could establish voluntariness of a defendant's confession by a pre­
ponderance of the evidence, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that the standard 
was proof beyond a reasonable doubt under state constitution); see also William J. 
Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. 
REv. 489, 498-502 (1977); Note, Stepping into the Breach: Basing Defendants' Rights on 
State Rather than Federal Law, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 339, 340-65 (1978); Jefferey 
White, Note, State Constitutional Guarantees as Adequate State Ground: Supreme Court 
Review and Problems of Federalism, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 737,738,749-77 (1976). 
25. See Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 408-09, 412-13, 589 N.E.2d 
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Miranda,26 however, find their source exclusively in the Fifth 
Amendment?? not Massachusetts law, for the SJC has not adopted 
the Miranda warnings under either the state constitution or state 
common law.28 
In Commonwealth v. Smith,29 the SJC nonetheless departed 
from the United States Supreme Court's determination of the effect 
of a Miranda violation on a subsequent; warned confession, as 
enunciated in Elstad,3° and applied the "cat-out-of-the-bag" and 
the "break-in-the-stream-of-events" analyses-explicitly rejected 
by Elstad31-to the question of a subsequent, warned statement's 
admissibility in evidence.32 The court justified its adoption of the 
review standards as common-law adjuncts to the Miranda warn­
ings.33 It held: 
1216,1220-21,1222-23 (1992) (creating a common-law test for granting a new trial when 
the defendant claints that the prosecution has withheld exculpatory evidence; test more 
protective of defendants than the federal test); Commonwealth v. Brusgulis, 398 Mass. 
325, 332 n.14, 496 N.E.2d 652, 657 n.14 (1986) (state double jeopardy protections exist 
pursuant to the common law, not the constitution, and are more protective than federal 
protections). . 
26. See infra notes 49-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Miranda 
requisites, which mandate that law enforcement agents inform a person subjected to 
custodial interrogation that he has the right to remain silent, that he has a right to have 
an attorney present during questioning, that counsel will be· appointed for him if he 
cannot afford an attorney, and that anything he says can be used against hint in a court 
of law. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966). A statement made in 
violation of Miranda is subject to a per se rille of exclusion. See id. at 444. 
27. In Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), the United States Supreme Court 
made the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution applicable to the states, 
via the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution: See id. at 6; accord 
Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 688-89 (1993). In Miranda, the Supreme Coilrt ex­
tended the Fifth Amendment's safeguards against custodial interrogations to the states. 
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467; accord Commonwealth v. Miranda, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 
939, 940, 641 N.E.2d 139, 140 (1994). 
28. See Commonwealth v. Ghee, 414 Mass. 313, 318 n.5, 607 N.E.2d 1005, 1009 
n.5 (1993) (declining to consider any state law question regarding the issue of adequacy 
of Miranda warnings given to the defendant, and noting that the court had not adopted 
the Miranda warnings under the state constitution); Commonwealth v. Snyder, 413 
Mass. 521, 530-31, 597 N.E.2d' 1363, 1368-69 (1992) (noting that the SJC has not 
adopted Miranda, or similar warnings under Article Twelve, because the Miranda 
warnings also furnish information about state constitutional rights). 
29. 412 Mass. 823, 593 N.E.2d 1288 (1992). 
30. 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
31. See id. at 304-06, 311. 
32. See Smith, 412 Mass. at 837, 593 N.E.2d at 1296. The "break-in-the-stream-of­
events" and the "cat-out-of-the-bag" analyses are discussed at infra notes 60-70 and the 
accompanying text. 
33. See Smith, 412 Mass. at 837, 593 N.E.2d at 1296 (declaring that the court 
would follow Commonwealth v. Haas, 373 Mass. 545, 369 N.E.2d 692 (1977), as a com­
mon-law rule of evidence); see also Snyder, 413 Mass. at 531, 597 N.E.2d at 1368-69 
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[W]here Federal law requires the administration of Miranda warn­
ings to a person in custody, the admissibility of incriminatory 
statements obtained in the circumstances that appear here [,a 
second, properly warned statement after an initial statement in 
violation of Miranda,] will, as [a] matter of State common law, be 
governed by the principles stated in Commonwealth v. Haas.34 
Yet, the SJC has never adopted the Miranda warnings them­
selves as a matter of state law.35 The alternate analyses embraced 
in Smith as tests for admissibility therefore constitute an impermis­
sible disregard for controlling federal authority defining the test for 
the admission in evidence of a subsequent, warned statement after 
an initia~ Miranda violation.36 Where the Supreme Court has de­
(citing Smith, the court noted that on occasion it had adopted "adjuncts" to the Mi­
randa warnings under state common law); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 402 Mass. 275, 
279,521 N.E.2d 1368, 1371 (1988) (discussing the interested adult doctrine for admissi­
bility of juveniles' confessions, a doctrine devised under the common law, which is an 
"adjunct" to the Miranda requisites). It is of interest to note that, at the time the SJC 
adopted the interested adult doctrine for juveniles, the United States Supreme Court 
had not applied the Miranda warnings to the custodial interrogation of minors. See 
Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 389 Mass. 128, 130-31, 130 n.l, 132 n.2, 135, 449 N.E.2d 
654,655 & n.l, 656 n.2 (1983) (stating that In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), which applied 
the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination protections to juveniles in delinquency pro­
ceedings, see id. at 55, did not mandate that the Miranda warnings apply to juveniles; 
and noting that Fare v. Michael c., 442 U.S. 707 (1979), assumed without deciding that 
the Miranda warnings are necessary for juveniles, see id. 707 n.4). Thus, the interested 
adult "adjunct" is not actually attached to the Miranda warnings. See THE AMERICAN 
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 22 (2d ed. 1992) (defining ad­
junct as "[s]omething attached to another in a dependent or subordinate position"; syn­
onym of appendage). 
34. Smith, 412 Mass. at 824, 593 N.E.2d at 1289 (emphasis added) (citing Com­
monwealth v. Haas, 373 Mass. 545, 369 N.E.2d 692 (1977), which had employed both 
the "cat-out-of-the-bag" and the "break-in-the-stream-of-events" tests to the question 
of the effect of a Miranda violation on a later, properly warned statement). See infra, 
notes 184-225 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of Smith. 
35. See Commonwealth v. Ghee, 414 Mass. 313, 318 n.5, 607 N.E.2d 1005, 1009 
n.5 (1993); Snyder, 413 Mass. at 530-31, 597 N.E.2d at 1368-69. 
36. In one notable instance, the Massachusetts SJC did not fare well in reinter­
preting federal constitutional precedent. In 1983, the court declined to follow Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), to determine whether probable cause existed under the 
Fourth Amendment. See Commonwealth v. Upton, 390 Mass. 562, 566-69, 458 N.E.2d 
717,719-21 (1983). The United States Supreme Court reversed the Upton court, con­
cluding that the SJC misunderstood Gates as a refinement, rather than a rejection, of 
the Aguilar-Spinelli test for probable cause. See Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727 
(1984); see also Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 
U.S. 108, 114 (1964). Onremand, the SJC adopted the Aguilar-Spinelli test under Arti­
cle Fourteen of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, which is the state constitu­
tional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. See Upton, 394 Mass. at 
374-75,476 N.E.2d at 556-57; see also supra note 23 (providing examples of cases where 
the SJC has provided the defendant more protection than warranted under the United 
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cided what test must be employed to determine the application of a 
federal exclusionary rule concerning a federal constitutional right, 
and where Massachusetts has not adopted the Miranda rights 
within its own law, the state cannot advance tests rejected by the 
Supreme Court, under its own law, to decide whether the federal 
exclusionary rule should apply.37 Further, although it embraced the 
two tests as a matter of state common law, the Smith court provided 
no explicit elucidation of the common-law source for the two tests, 
nor any guidance as to why two tests are necessary and which analy­
sis applies in a given case. Finally, in interpreting the tests, the 
court has moved from a subjective determination to an objective 
one, skewing the proper focus and possibly resulting in the suppres­
sion of wholly voluntary statements due to a purely technical Mi­
randa violation. 
In Part I, this article will discuss the origins of, and rationale 
for, the Miranda warnings, as well as the question of voluntariness 
of custodial statements. It will review the historical tests applied to 
voluntariness issues and violations of Miranda in Part II. It will 
States Constitution). By contrast, in Commonwealth v. Gallarelli, 399 Mass. 17, 502 
N.E.2d 516 (1987), the court refused to adopt United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 
(1985), concerning discovery requests, and instead adhered to Massachusetts precedent, 
which it viewed to possess "more prudent safeguards of defendants' rights." Gallarelli, 
399 Mass. at 21 & n.5, 502 N.E.2d at 519 & n.5. The court later noted that it had not 
shown its hand in Gallarelli; in articulating further refinement of the state discovery 
test, the court in that case had not specified whether its approach, based on Massachu­
setts case law, was under the constitution or common law. See Commonwealth v. Thc­
ceri, 412 Mass. 401, 408, 589 N.E.2d 1216, 1221 (1992). Gallarelli and Tucceri, however, 
are founded on a body of Massachusetts case law and therefore constitute state com­
mon-law tests concerning discovery. Indeed, the Tucceri court recognized that it had 
fashioned a common-law discovery rule: See Tucceri, 412 Mass. at 412-13, 589 N.E.2d at 
1223; see also Lyons v. Howard, 250 F.2d 912, 915 (1st Cir. 1958), rev'd on other 
grounds, 360 U.S. 593 (1959) (federal common law is the body of decisional law devel­
oped by the federal courts); Commonwealth v. Aldoupolis, 390 Mass. 438, 446, 457 
N.E.2d 268, 273 (1983) (companion cases) (noting that common-law precedent, in both 
the state's decisional law and reports of the King's Bench, allowed a trial judge to select 
a jury from a foreign venire when an impartial jury could not be selected from the 
county venire); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 345-46 (4th ed. 1968) (common law stems 
"from the judgments and decrees of the courts recognizing, affirming, and enforcing 
such usages and customs ..."; "[i]n a wider sense than any of the [preceding defini­
tions], the 'common law' may designate all that part of the positive law, juristic theory, 
and ancient custom of any state or nation"). In both Gallarelli and Tucceri, the court 
adhered to established state case law, and in Upton, the court specifically adopted its 
own probable cause test under the state constitution. It is clear that, when deviating 
from a federal constitutional standard, the court, either expressly or impliedly, must 
establish an independent state constitutional or common-law ground. See supra notes 
2-4, 21 and accompanying text. As noted above, Miranda is not part of the state consti­
tutional or common-law scheme. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
37. See supra notes 2-4, cases cited therein and the accompanying text. 
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examine, in Part III, the federal analysis established by Elstad. It 
will consider the post-Elstad Massachusetts twin tests, their effi­
cacy, and their application in Part IV. In conclusion, the article will 
explain how the SJC legitimately could have established its own ex­
clusionary rule under the state constitution, not the common law, 
and how the court has refashioned the two voluntariness tests away 
from consideration of the suspect's mental state to an objective test 
bordering on a per se rule of exclusion for all statements following 
an initial, technical Miranda violation. This rigid rule may be too 
exacting for law enforcement agents and society to bear, for it may 
result in the exclusion from evidence of wholly voluntary and relia­
ble statements due to noncoercive missteps by police officers. 
I. MIRANDA'S ORIGINS & REQUISITES 
The United States Supreme Court, troubled by the coercive at­
mosphere present in state law enforcement agents' questioning of 
suspects,38 employed the United States Constitution to provide pro­
tections to persons subjected to questioning by state police person­
nel.39 As Chief Justice Earl Warren expounded: 
[W]e are forced to resolve a conflict between two fundamental 
interests of society; its interest in prompt and efficient law en­
forcement and its interest in preventing the rights of its individual 
members from being abridged by unconstitutional methods of 
law enforcement. ... The abhorrence of society to the use of 
involuntary confessions does not turn alone on their inherent un­
trustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the 
police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end 
life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods 
used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual 
criminals themselves.4o 
38. See Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 193-95 (1957) (incommunicado deten­
tion); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 559-60 (1954) (psychiatric inducement); Watts v. 
Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52 (1949) (continuous questioning); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 
278, 281-83 (1936) (physical beating). 
39. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 315, 321-24 (1959) (noting that case to 
be "another in the long line of cases presenting the question whether a confession was 
properly admitted into evidence under the Fourteenth Amendment"; the defendant was 
a foreign-born man with little education and a history of emotional instability, who had 
been questioned by "many" men for eight straight hours before he confessed; statement 
had to be suppressed); Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390, 393-401 (1958) (examining 
under the Fourteenth Amendment the circumstances surrounding a confession; the de­
fendant was lassoed with a rope and dragged toward a tree; the defendant confessed 
some twenty hours later and alleged no other physical or mental coercion). 
40. Spano, 360 U.S. at 315,320-21. 
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The Court had concerns not only with the inherent unreliability of a 
coerced confession, but with the unlawful conduct of police officers. 
Beginning in 1936, the United States Supreme Court reviewed 
confessions in state cases under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, to determine whether the statements 
were coerced.41 Coercion includes threats, violence, direct or im­
plied promises, and any improper influence.42 A coerced statement 
is deemed inadmissible in evidence; a confession extorted through 
torture or some other means of coercion offends principles of due 
process.43 
In 1964, in Massiah v. United States,44 the Court held that the 
right to counsel established by the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution applied to postindictment statements elicited by 
law enforcement agents in the absence of counse1.45 Later that 
41. See, e.g., id. at 321 nn.2 & 3, 321-23 (questioning begun in the evening, and did 
not conclude until the morning; persistent questions despite the suspect's refusal to 
speak on the advice of counsel; the police officers ignored the suspect's repeated re­
quests to contact his attorney and compelled his childhood friend to make false state­
ments designed to elicit a confession; the suspect was emotionally unstable, tense, and 
had been discharged from the military due to a psychiatric disorder); Ashcraft v. Ten­
nessee, 322 U.S. 143, 145, 149-50, 152-53 (1944) (the defendant was brought into a room 
and placed under a light; the police officers quizzed him in "relays" over a thirty-six 
hour period; the Court concluded that the statement was "not voluntary but come 
pelled"); Brown, 297 U.S. at 279, 282, 285-86, 287 (one defendant was hung twice from 
a tree, tied to a tree and whipped, released, again taken into custody, and whipped until 
he confessed; other defendants were stripped of their clothing and beaten with a leather 
strap with buckles on it; the defendants were told that they would be beaten until they 
confessed, and until they confessed in "correct" detail; the confessions were extracted 
by torture; convictions based in part on involuntary confessions offended due process 
and therefore were void); see also Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 688 (1993) (the 
Court noted the established practice, beginning with Brown, of reviewing coerced con­
fessions in state cases under the Fourteenth Amendment in the thirty years prior to the 
application of the Fifth Amendment to states); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 
285-88 (1991) (citing the Supreme Court cases reviewing confessions in state cases for 
coerciveness under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
42. See Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30 (1976); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 
742, 753 (1970); see also KENT B. SMITH, 30 MASSACHUSElTS PRACTICE: CRIMINAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 366 (West 2d ed. 1983). 
43. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961) (stating that it is a viola­
tion of due process to admit an involuntary statement into evidence, regardless of its 
truth or falsity; cannot coerce a defendant to prove the charge against him "out of his 
own mouth"); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1940) (finding it offensive to 
due process and to civilization to use coerced statements obtained by secret inquisition 
against defendant at trial). 
44. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
45. See id. at 205-06. The Sixth Amendment was made applicable to the states in 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963). 
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year, in Escobedo v. Illinois,46 the Court extended the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel to preindictment custodial interroga­
tions in certain circumstances.47 In both Massiah and Escobedo, 
the Supreme Court viewed the presence and advice of counsel as 
important to offset the possibility of coercion in a custodial 
setting.48 
Two years later, in Miranda, the Court expressly applied the 
Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination protections to the states.49 
Recognizing the coercion inherent in a custodial setting,SO the Mi­
randa Court mandated that a person in custody,S1 subjected to in­
terrogation,s2 be informed "in clear and unequivocal terms that he 
46. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
47. See id. at 490-91. The circumstances are: the investigation has focused on the 
suspect; he is in custody; statements are elicited during questioning; he requests and is 
denied counsel; and he has not been informed of his right to remain silent. See id. The 
Supreme Court later recognized Escobedo as a Fifth Amendment case. See Moran v. 
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 429 (1986); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972); Johnson v. 
New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729 (1966). The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches 
at the onset of adversarial criminal judicial proceedings against a defendant. See 
Burbine, 475 U.S. at 428; United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180,187 (1984); Kirby, 406 
U.S. at 689-90. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to the preindict­
ment stage. See Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 187; Kirby, 406 U.S. at 690. 
48. See Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 488-91 (noting possibilities of abuse, including bul­
lying, physical force, and torture, as well as the history of extorted confessions); Mas
siah, 377 U.S. at 204-06 (expressing concern over "secret interrogations" taking place 
absent the effective assistance of counsel). " 
49. See MiIanda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966); supra notes 10-11 and the 
accompanying text. 
50. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 ("[I]nherently compelling pressures which work 
to undermine the individual's will to"resist and to compel him to speak where he would 
not otherwise do so freely."). 
51. See id. The Court held that the Miranda warnings are required whenever a 
person is questioned "while in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in 
any significant way." Id. at 444; accord Commonwealth v. McDonough, 400 Mass. 639, 
655, 511 N.E.2d 551, 561 (1987). In determining whether a suspect is in custody for 
purposes of Miranda, the courts consider a number of factors, including the nature of 
the crime, the site of the interrogation, the status of the investigation at the time of 
questioning, the police officers' conduct toward the suspect, the suspect's reasonable 
belief as to his freedom of action, and his ability to leave the place of questioning. See 
Commonwealth v. Merritt, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 601, 604-05, 441 N.E.2d 532, 535-36 
(1982); Commonwealth v. Doyle, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 786, 793, 429 N.E.2d 346, 350 
(1981). " 
52. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. Interrogation constitutes express questioning or 
its functional equivalent. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980); Com­
monwealth v. Rubio, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 506, 511, 540 N.E.2d 189, 192 (1989). Interroga­
tion includes both words and actions, beyond those normally attendant to arrest and 
custody, which a police officer should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminat­
ing response from a suspect. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 302; Rubio, 27 Mass. App. Ct. at 
512, 540 N.E.2d at 192. A reviewing court will look to both the suspect's perceptions 
and the police officers' intent in determining whether the police officers engaged in 
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has the right to remain silent,"53 that if he chooses to speak, any­
thing he says can and will be used against him in court,54 that he has 
the right to have counsel present at questioning,55 and that if he 
does not have or cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed 
to represent him.56 Once the detainee receives the Miranda warn­
ings and asserts his right to remain silent, questioning must cease.57 
Similarly, if the detainee wishes the presence and advice of counsel, 
all questioning must abate until an attorney is present.58 State-
interrogation. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 n.7; Rubio, 27 Mass. App. Ct. at 512, 540 
N.E.2d at 192-93. 
53. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-68. 
54. See id. at 469. 
55. See id. The Court noted that "the right to have counsel present at the interro­
gation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege ...." Id. 
The right to counsel in this context stems from a defendant's Fifth, not Sixth, Amend­
ment interests. See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 n.5 (1984); Common­
wealth v. Stirk, 392 Mass. 909, 911, 467 N.E.2d 870, 872 (1984); see also supra note 47, 
cases cited therein and the accompanying text. 
56. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 472-73. The Court termed the Miranda warnings 
"procedural safeguards" of the self-incrimination privilege. [d. at 478-79. They are not 
part of the constitutional privilege itself, but are measures to insure that the right is 
protected. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 
U.S. 433, 444 (1974); see also infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text. 
57. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74. The detainee also has the right to cut off 
questioning at any time. See id. If a defendant claims that he asserted his right to si­
lence, the issue is whether the suspect's '''right to cut off questioning' was 'scrupulously 
honored.'" Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 
474, 479); accord Commonwealth v. Gallant, 381 Mass. 465, 468, 410 N.E.2d 704, 706 
(1980) (companion cases); Commonwealth v. D'Entremont, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 474,477, 
632 N.E.2d 1239, 1241 (1994). But Miranda did not "create a per se proscription of 
indefinite duration upon any further questioning by any police officer on the subject, 
once the person in custody has indicated a desire to remain silent." Mosley, 423 U.S. at 
102-03; accord United States v. Barone, 968 F.2d 1378, 1382-83 (1st Cir. 1992); 
D'Entremont, 36 Mass. App. Ct. at 477,632 N.E.2d at 1241. The Mosley Court consid­
ered several factors in determining whether that defendant's right to cut off questioning 
had been scrupulously honored, including: whether, upon his assertion of his right, the 
law enforcement agents immediately ceased questioning him; whether a significant pe­
riod of time elapsed before further questioning; and whether he received "fresh" Mi­
randa warnings before further interrogation. See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 106; see also 
Jacobs v. Singletary, 952 F.2d 1282, 1293 (11th Cir. 1992). The hiatus of time does not 
control. See Barone, 968 F.2d at 1383; United States v. Hsu, 852 F.2d 407, 410 (9th Cir. 
1988). Police officers must refrain from any coercive behavior during that interim. See, 
e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 992 F.2d 301, 305 & n.5, 306 (11th Cir. 1993) (while 
twenty minutes elapsed, the police officers encouraged the defendant to talk); Barone, 
968 F.2d at 1380, 1384 (after the defendant invoked his right to remain silent, the police 
officers repeatedly encouraged him to talk during a two-hour period); Singletary, 952 
F.2d at 1293 (when the defendant asserted her right to remain silent, the police officers 
ignored her and continued with their questioning). 
58. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469. The Miranda right to counsel is distinct from 
the right to remain silent. See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 683 (1988) (right to 
remain silent different from request for counsel; law enforcement agents can never pro­
1998] CAT-OUT-OF-THE-BAG & BREAK-IN-THE-STREAM-OF-EVENTS 185 

ments made in violation of Miranda are inadmissible in evidence at 
trial, for they are presumptively tainted. 59 
II. MIRANDA VERSUS VOLUNTARINESS 
A. 	 Origins of "Cat-out-of-the-Bag" & "Break-in-the-Stream-of­
Events" Tests 
Courts generally engage in a two-tier analysis on the question 
of the admissibility in evidence of a defendant's custodial state­
ments: whether the defendant made a knowing and intelligent 
waiver of his Miranda rights, under the Fifth Amendment;60 and 
whether he made the statements voluntarily, under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.61 While interrelated, the two inquiries are distinct.62 
The courts generally consider the same factors on the dual ques­
tions of waiver and voluntariness, which include the suspect's con­
duct and characteristics, as well as the law enforcement agents' 
ceed with questioning without the presence of an attorney, if requested by the de­
tainee); Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104 n.10 (Miranda's discussion of right to counsel applied 
different procedural safeguards for that right); Commonwealth v. Brant, 380 Mass. 876, 
882, 884, 406 N.E.2d 1021, 1026 (1980) (Mosley involved right to remain silent, not 
claim of denial of right to an attorney). If a suspect exercises his right to counsel, ques­
tioning must cease and cannot resume until an attorney is obtained for him, unless the 
suspect himself initiates further communication. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 
484-85 (1981); D'Entremont, 36 Mass. App. Ct. at 478, 632 N.E.2d at 1242. Unlike the 
right to remain silent, the right to counsel, once invoked, creates a per se proscription 
against further questioning initiated by law enforcement agents. 
59. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; Commonwealth v. Adams, 389 Mass. 265, 268, 
450 N.E.2d 149, 151 (1983). If questioning proceeds without counsel, the government 
bears the "heavy burden" to prove that the detainee knowingly and intelligently waived 
his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 
475. That burden is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Parker, 
402 Mass. 333,340,522 N.E.2d 924, 928 (1988) (companion cases); Commonwealth v. 
Day, 387 Mass. 915, 921, 444 N.E.2d 384, 387 (1983). There is no distinction between 
confessions and admissions under Miranda. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476; Common­
wealth v. Garcia, 379 Mass. 422, 431, 399 N.E.2d 460, 467 (1980). The exclusionary rule 
applies even if the statement is exculpatory. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477; Common­
wealth v. Gil, 393 Mass. 204, 212, 471 N.E.2d 30, 37 (1984). 
60. See Parker, 402 Mass. at 340, 522 N.E.2d at 928; Day, 387 Mass. at 920, 444 
N.E.2d at 387. "The record must affirmatively indicate not merely that the suspect or 
the accused comprehended his rights but intentionally relinquished them." Common­
wealth v. Williams, 378 Mass. 217, 225, 391 N.E.2d 1202, 1208 (1979); accord Brewer v. 
Williams, 430 U.S. 387,404 (1977); Commonwealth v. Dustin, 373 Mass. 612, 615, 368 
N.E.2d 1388, 1391 (1977). 
61. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1964); Commonwealth v. Tavares, 
385 Mass. 140, 145, 430 N.E.2d 1198, 1202. 
62. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 388 Mass. 846, 852, 448 N.E.2d 1114, 1119 
(1983); Tavares, 385 Mass. at 145, 430 N.E.2d at 1202; Commonwealth v. Garcia, 379 
Mass. 422,443-44,399 N.E.2d 460, 473-74 (1980); see also SMITH supra note 42, § 365. 
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behavior.63 
When assessing the voluntariness of confessions under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has historically con­
side red whether a confession was the product of some earlier ille­
gality.64 For instance, if a suspect's first statement was the product 
of actual coercion, any subsequent statement, if part of the same 
stream of events, also was deemed to be coerced and therefore was 
suppressed.65 Statements falling on the heels of a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution also were 
subject to suppression: "[A] confession obtained through custodial 
interrogation after an illegal arrest should be excluded unless inter­
vening events break the causal connection between the illegal arrest 
and the confession so that the confession is 'sufficiently an act of 
free will to purge the primary taint."'66 "Break-in-the-stream-of­
63. See Commonwealth v. Silva, 388 Mass. 495, 501, 447 N.E.2d 646, 651 (1983); 
Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244, 267, 431 N.E.2d 880, 895 (1982). A de­
fendant's age, education, experience, and drug or alcohol intake are all factors which 
the courts consider in assessing the voluntariness of the Miranda waiver and of the 
subsequent statement. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1973); 
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 425 Mass. 361, 366, 682 N.E.2d 591, 596 (1997); Com­
monwealth v. Selby, 420 Mass. 656, 664-65, 651 N.E.2d 843, 849 (1995); Tavares, 385 
Mass. at 144-46,430 N.E.2d at 1201-03; see also SMITH, supra note 42, § 371 and cases 
cited therein. 
The first part of the test-judicial review-is constitutionally mandated. See Com­
monwealth v. Watkins, 425 Mass. 830, 835, 683 N.E.2d 653, 657 (1997); Tavares, 385 
Mass. at 145, 430 N.E.2d at 1202.. The second part-submission of the issue to the 
jury-is not constitutionally required. See Watkins, 425 Mass. at 835, 683 N.E.2d at 657; 
Commonwealth v. Cole, 380 Mass. 30, 40, 402 N.E.2d 55, 61 (1980). The prosecution 
must prove that the statement was made voluntarily beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
Watkins, 425 Mass. at 835, 683 N.E.2d at 657;.Tavares, 385 Mass. 151-52,430 N.E.2d at 
1206. 
64. See Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346, 349 (1968) (the defendant was held 
incommunicado for thirty to forty-eight hours, deprived of counsel, although his attor­
neys tried to gain access to him; no break in the stream of events between the time of 
subsequent confession and the coercive atmosphere that existed before); Beecher v. 
Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 38 (1967) (no break in the stream of events from the point where 
the defendant was initially told, at gunpoint, to speak his guilt or be killed); Clewis v. 
Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 708, 710-11 (1967) (the first statement was made immediately after 
the arrest that was not supported by probable cause; the defendant was then subjected 
to prolonged, although intermittent, questioning; no break in the stream of events insu­
lating later confession from "what had occurred before"); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 
441,444 (1961) (the defendant was held without food, counsel, family; he was physically 
weak and in pain; the coercive atmosphere surrounding the first statement led into the 
second); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 561 (1954) (continuous coercive process). 
65. See infra note 66 and cases cited therein. 
66. Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690 (1982) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602 (1975)); accord Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305­
06 (1985); see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (stating the 
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events" thus became a metaphor for the voluntariness test. 
The Court also employed another voluntariness metaphor, one 
it explained in United States v. Bayer.67 
[A ]fter an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confess­
ing, no matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of 
the psychological and practical disadvantages of having con­
fessed. He can never get the cat back in the bag. The secret is out 
for good. In such a sense, a later confession may always be 
looked upon as a fruit of the first.68 
The "cat-out-of-the-bag" test, as first formulated, was subjective: 
The cat-out-of-the-bag line of analysis requires the exclusion of a 
statement if, in giving the [subsequent] statement, the defendant 
was motivated by the belief that, after a prior coerced statement, 
his effort to withhold further information would be futile and he 
had nothing to lose by repetition or amplification of the earlier 
statements. Such a statement would be inadmissible as the direct 
product of the earlier coerced statement.69 
Because they bore on the question of actual coercion, the "cat­
out-of-the-bag" and the "break-in-the-stream-of-events" tests 
looked to the effect of the detainee's prior statement, or the con­
duct of the interrogation process, on his state of 'mind when he 
made the subsequent statement. But, as the Bayer Court noted: 
"[T]his Court has never gone so far as to hold that making a confes­
sion under circumstances which preclude its use, perpetually dis­
ables the confessor from making a usable one after 'those conditions 
have been removed."70 The two tests were not per se rules of ex­
clusion. As shall be seen, however, the SJC departed from that sub­
jective focus on the question of coercion and applied the tests to 
concept of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment 
violations). 
67. 331 U.S. 532 (1947). 
68. ld. at 540 (emphasis added). 
69. Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 686, 335· N.E.2d 660', 675 (1975) 
(emphasis added) (a case in which private citizens ipterrogated the defendant; therefore 
Miranda did not apply); accord Commonwealth v. Watkins, 375 Mass. 472, 480, 379 
N.E.2d 1040, 1045 (1978). . 
70. Bayer, 331 U.S. at 540-41 (upholding the admissibility of the defendant's sec­
ond confession, made six months after the initial, involuntary one, but aft~r being. told 
that his confession could be used against him); see also Mahnke, 368 Mass. at 676, 682, 
335 N.E.2d at 669, 673 (while the first confession was coerced, the second was not the 
product of intimidation existing at the time of the first statement, and the defendant did 
not think that his remarks would expose him to jeopardy). 
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Miranda violations absent the existence of actual coercive elements 
rendering the statements involuntary. 
B. Massachusetts' Application of the Tests Pre-Elstad 
Massachusetts initially applied the "cat-out-of-the-bag" and 
the "break-in-the-stream-of-events" tests to the question of volun­
tariness.71 It later, like some other jurisdictions, extended the anal­
yses to the question of the admissibility in evidence of a properly 
warned statement after an initial Miranda violation.72 
The SJC properly utilized both tests on the question of volun­
tariness in Commonwealth v. Mahnke.73 Defendant Mahnke, sus­
pected of having murdered his girlfriend, was abducted and 
interrogated by her family members and friends.74 Since the de­
fendant was not held and questioned by police officers, the SJC, 
reviewing the admissibility of his statements at trial, rejected his 
contention of a Miranda violation.75 The court noted that Miranda 
applies only to custodial questioning by law enforcement agents.76 
Finding that Miranda did not mandate suppression, the 
Mahnke court turned to the Fourteenth Amendment question of 
voluntariness.77 The court stated: "A conviction founded in whole 
or in part on statements which are the product of physical or psy­
chological coercion deprives the defendant of his right to due pro­
cess of law under the Fourteenth Amendment and, as a 
consequence, is invalid."78 The court reviewed the totality of the 
circumstances to decide whether the government met its burden to 
prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence.79 The 
Mahnke court recognized that a finding that an initial statement 
was involuntary does not necessarily require suppression of any 
later statements.80 "It is equally true ... that the defendant may 
71. See Mahnke, 368 Mass. at 682-83, 335 N.E.2d at 673; Commonwealth v. 
White, 353 Mass. 409, 417,232 N.E.2d 335, 341 (1967). 
72. See Commonwealth v. Watkins, 375 Mass. 472, 482, 379 N.E.2d 1040, 1046-47 
(1978); Commonwealth v. Haas, 373 Mass. 545, 554, 369 N.E.2d 692, 699 (1977); see also 
United States v. Lee, 699 F.2d 466, 468-69 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Nash, 563 
F.2d 1166, 1169 (5th Cir. 1977). 
73. 368 Mass. at 682-83, 335 N.E.2d at 673. 
74. See id. at 699-71, 335 N.E.2d at 666-67. 
75. See id. at 676, 335 N.E.2d at 669 . 
. 76. See id., 335 N.E.2d at 669-70 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 
(1966». 
77. See id. at 679, 335 N.E.2d at 671. 
78. Id. 
79. See id. at 680, 335 N.E.2d at 672. 
80. See id. at 681, 335 N.E.2d at 672-73. 
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have been under no compulsion at the time of the later statements 
and may have felt no effect of the earlier abuse at the time. The 
later statements, then, would be admissible."81 An initial coercive 
atmosphere does not presumptively taint whatever occurs 
afterward. 
The court then applied both the "break-in-the-stream-of­
events" and "cat-out-of-the-bag" analyses to defendant Mahnke's 
statements.82 The court concluded that, while the defendant's ini­
tial statements were the product of intimidation and violence, his 
later statements were made after all hostility ceased.83 Thus, there 
had been a break in the stream of events.84 Nor was the cat out of 
the bag, for the defendant did not believe that his earlier state­
ments-wherein he described the victim's death as accidental-ex­
posed him to serious adverse effects.85 The Mahnke court 
concluded that the defendant's later statements were voluntary and, 
thus, properly admitted in evidence at his murder tria1.86 Notable is 
the court's application of both metaphors to assess the defendant's 
actual mental state on the question of coercion. 
In later precedent, the SIC applied the "cat-out-of-the-bag" 
and the "break-in-the-stream-of-events" voluntariness analyses to 
warned statements which followed earlier statements made in viola­
tion of Miranda.87 Without explanation, it shifted Fourteenth 
Amendment analysis into the question of the remedy for violations 
of the Fifth Amendment. 
In Commonwealth v. Haas,88 the court utilized both the "cat­
out-of-the-bag" and the "break-in-the-stream-of-events" tests to 
determine the admissibility in evidence of the defendant's warned 
81. Id. at 682, 335 N.E.2d at 673. 
82. See id. at 682-87, 335 N.E.2d at 673-77. The court distinguished the tests by 
noting that the "break-in-the-stream-of-events" analysis focuses on whether external 
constraints, either continuing or new, overbore the suspect's will, id. at 682,335 N.E.2d 
at 673, while the "cat-out-of-the-bag" inquiry looks more specifically at the effect of the 
earlier statement on the suspect's will, see id. at 683, 335 N.E.2d at 673. The subsequent 
statement cannot "'merely [be] the product of [an] erroneous impression that the cat 
was already out of the bag.'" Id. at 687, 335 N.E.2d at 675 (quoting Darwin v. Connect­
icut, 391 U.S. 346, 351 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part»; see 
also supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text (discussing the tests). 
83. See Mahnke, 368 Mass. at 683-84,335 N.E.2d at 673-74. 
84. See id. at 685, 335 N.E.2d at 674. 
85. See id. at 687, 335 N.E.2d at 676. 
86. See id. at 691,335 N.E.2d at 678. 
87. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Watkins, 375 Mass. 472,480-81, 379 N.E.2d 1040, 
1045-46 (1978). 
88. 373 Mass. 545, 369 N.E.2d 692 (1977). 
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statement following an earlier Miranda violation.89 Defendant 
Haas reported to work at 7:30 a.m. on June 23,1973.90 At approxi­
mately 10:15 a.m., the defendant told a colleague that he had re­
ceived an anonymous telephone call informing him that his family 
had been "'taken care of. "'91 The defendant contacted the police 
department and asked that someone check on his family'S welfare.92 
A police officer went to the defendant's home, found the front door 
ajar with a key in the lock, entered the premises, and discovered the 
dead bodies of the defendant's wife and children.93 
Subsequent police investigation determined that there was no 
sign of forced entry and little sign of physical disturbance.94 The 
medical examiner concluded that the victims died between 3:00 a.m. 
and 5:00 a.m.95 When the defendant called to inquire of his family's 
well-being, a police officer told him to come home.96 The defend­
ant arrived at home, and police officers transported him to the po­
lice station.97 .There, a police officer apprised the defendant of the 
fatalities and asked him when he departed for work that morning.98 
The defendant responded, "'I want to be helpful. 1 left between 
6:15 and 6:30."'99 Police officers arrested the defendant and admin­
istered the Miranda warnings to him; he reiterated that he left for 
work at 6:30 a.m.100 An inventory of the defendant's personal ef­
fects disclosed notes bearing the words "'gloves, overalls, bags, 
ether, mask. "'101 
Charged with the murders of his wife and children, the defend­
ant moved to suppress his statements and the physical evidence, 
asserting that he should have been advised of the Miranda warnings 
. 89. See id. at 554, 369 N.E.2d at 699. . 
90. See id. at 546, 369 N.E.2d at 695. 
91. Id. at 547, 369 N.E.2d at 695. The defendant told his coworker that the caller 
said '''black and white don't mix.'" Id., 369 N.E.2d at 695. The defendant was Cauca­
sian; his wife was African-American. See id. at 547 n.1, 369 N.E.2d at 695 n.l. 
92. See id. at 547, 369 N.E.2d at 695. 
93. See id. Defendant's wife and children lay in their own beds, and their heads 
were covered with white plastic bags secured with adhesive tape. See id. 
94. See id. Police officers found a sign, reading '''[b]lack and white don't mix'" in 
the master bedroom. Id. 
95. See id. at 547-48, 369 N.E.2d at 696. 
96. See id. at 548, 369 N.E.2d at 695. 
97. See id. 
98. See id., 369 N.E.2d at 696. 
99. Id. 
100. See id. Defendant also said that he slept with his wife in the master bedroom 
the night before. See id. 
101. Id. 
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at the outset of questioning.102 The trial judge found that the de­
fendant had not been subjected to custodial interrogation and de­
nied the motion to suppress_I03 
On appeal from his convictions, the defendant claimed that his 
arrest was not supported by probable cause; therefore, his state­
ments were the tainted fruit of that illegality.l04 The Common­
wealth conceded that the police officers did not have probable 
cause to arrest the defendant, but contended that he was not in cus­
tody.lo5 The SJC held that the defendant indeed was in custody and 
therefore should have been informed of the Miranda requisites 
before questioning.106 The court concluded both that there was no 
break in the stream of events between the Miranda violation and 
the later, warned statement, and that the cat was out of the bag 
when the defendant disclosed the time that he left his home.107 The 
court applied tests, formulated to assess the effect of an initial, actu­
ally coerced statement on the voluntariness of a subsequent state­
ment, to a statement made after a technical Miranda violation but 
absent any actual coercion. The court, however, did not explain its 
reason for extending the voluntariness tests to the question of a Mi­
randa violation, which resulted in the exclusion from evidence of 
apparently voluntary statements. lOS 
Justice Robert Braucher, concurring, found that the exclusion 
from evidence of Haas's statements, due solely to a Miranda viola­
tion, was "unjust."I09 He questioned the benefit of applying the ex­
clusionary rule to that case, where reliable, voluntary statements 
were barred from evidence to deter law enforcement misconduct in 
a matter wherein the police officers acted in good faith and did not 
mislead the defendant.110 Justice Braucher called upon the United 
102. See id. 
103. See id. 
104. See id. at 551,369 N.E.2d at 696 (the defendant relied on Brown v. Illinois, 
422 U.S. 590 (1975), and Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), apparently 
attempting to invoke the Fourth Amendment "fruit of the poisonous tree" exclusionary 
rule, which bars the fruit of an unlawful arrest from admission into evidence unless 
some circumstance removes the initial taint). 
105. See Haas, 373 Mass. at 551, 369 N.E.2d at 697. 
106. See id. at 551-52, 369 N.E.2d at 69S. 
107. See id. at 554, 369 N.E.2d at 699 ("[T]he cat was out of the bag .... The effect 
of the tainted confession was not dissipated by the time of the next confession. A be­
lated adequate warning could not put the cat back in the bag.") (quoting Gilpin v. 
United States, 415 F.2d 63S, 642 (5th Cir. 1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
lOS. See id. at 549 n.4, 554 n.S, 369 N.E.2d at 696 n.4, 699 n.S. 
109. Id. at 564, 369 N.E.2d at 705 (Braucher, J., concurring). 
110. See id. at 565, 369 N.E.2d at 705 (Braucher, J., concurring). 
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States Supreme Court to rectify what he perceived to be a confused 
and arbitrary rule.lll 
While the Haas opinion discloses that the police officers knew 
the cat was out of the bag when the defendant told them what time 
he left for work, there is nothing in the decision demonstrating that 
the defendant also knew that he had made an incriminating admis­
sion, other than the occurrence of his formal arrest. No traditional 
coercive elements existed, as there was nothing demonstrating that 
Haas felt it futile to refuse to speak after making his first statement; 
nor was there any inkling of actual coercive forces prompting his 
first statement, made because he wished to "'be helpful."'1l2 In­
deed, the SJC upheld the trial judge's finding that both statements 
were voluntary, deeming that conclusion "amply supported by the 
record. "113 Although the court did not expressly say so, it appears 
that the court assumed that the presumptive taint of the initial Mi­
randa violation extended beyond that initial error to the second, 
properly warned statement. This constitutes a confusion of Mi­
randa's per se bar of statements taken in violation of its precepts 
with the traditional test of voluntariness, which did not presume 
that an initial act of coercion necessarily tainted what occurred 
afterward. 
One year later, the court alluded to Haas in evaluating the ad­
missibility of a defendant's statements in another murder case. De­
fendant Watkins came to Massachusetts from Kentucky and 
participated in the armed robbery, kidnapping, and murder of a 
motorist.114 The defendant fled to Kentucky, where he later was 
discovered by law enforcement agents in an automobile matching 
the description of the victim's motor vehicle.115 Police officers ar­
rested the defendant, seized the automobile, searched it, and ascer­
tained that it indeed belonged to the victim.116 The law 
enforcement agents from Massachusetts then went to Kentucky, ad­
vised the defendant of the Miranda warnings, and questioned 
him.117 After a few preliminary questions, the defendant requested 
counsel; the police officers, however, asked whether the defendant 
111. See id. (Braucher, J., concurring). 
112. Id. at 548, 369 N.E.2d at 696. 
113. Id. at 549 n.4, 554 n.8, 369 N.E.2d at 696 n.4, 699 n.8. 
114. See Commonwealth v. Watkins, 375 Mass. 472, 475, 379 N.E.2d 1040, 1043 
(1978). 
115. See id. at 477, 379 N.E.2d at 1044. 
116. See id. 
117. See id. 
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wanted an attorney or whether he wished to talk about statements 
that he had made to the Kentucky police officers. US The defendant 
agreed to speak, and admitted to being in Boston for several 
days.119 
The defendant again requested an attorney, and the police of­
ficers allowed him to use the telephone.12o The defendant did not 
call an attorney; rather, he contacted family members.121 He then 
agreed to speak with the police officers and made admissions of the 
events culminating in the victim's death.122 
During the defendant's trial, the trial judge conducted a voir 
dire concerning the admissibility in evidence of the defendant's 
statements and ruled that the defendant had not waived his right to 
counseP23 The trial judge concluded that the police officers should 
have terminated the interview when the defendant initially re­
quested an attorney.124 Finding a violation of the defendant's right 
to counsel, the trial judge suppressed all statements made by the 
defendant immediately after that point in questioning.125 The trial 
judge, however, admitted into evidence those statements made by 
the defendant after he used the telephone, finding that his right to 
cut off questioning at that juncture had been scrupulously 
honored.126 The trial judge also rejected the defendant's conten­
tions that his Miranda waiver was not voluntary.127 
Relying on Haas in his appeal from his convictions, the defend­
ant alleged that the "cat-out-of-the-bag" theory applied, as his later 
statements to the police officers were the product of "his mistaken 
belief that he had irretrievably implicated himself by his earlier, and 
118. See id. at 477-78, 379 N.E.2d at 1044. 
119. See id. at 478, 379 N.E.2d at 1044. 
120. See id. 
121. See id. 
122. See id. 
123. See id. 
124. See id., 379 N.E.2d at 1044-45. 
125. See id., 379 N.E.2d at 1045; see also supra notes 57-59 and accompanying 
text. 
126. See Watkins, 375 Mass. at 479, 379 N.E.2d at 1045. The trial judge relied on 
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). See supra note 57 for cases dealing with the 
issue of post-Miranda statements. Under Mosley, if a defendant asserts his right to 
remain silent, police officers can renew questioning if they immediately terminate the 
initial interview upon the defendant's election of his right, allow a significant period of 
time to elapse, and administer "fresh" Miranda warnings to him. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 
106. 
127. See Watkins, 375 Mass. at 479, 379 N.E.2d at 1045. The defendant alleged 
fear of reprisal, pain due to an automobile collision, and injury resultant from beatings 
by police officers. See id. 
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subsequently determined, illegal statements."128 The SJC acknowl­
edged that the analysis applied to the question whether a confession 
had actually been coerced.129 The Watkins court, however, stated 
that the trial judge found, and the record disclosed, that the defend­
ant's statements were voluntary and not the result of coercion.13° 
The court noted that the Haas court only "peripherally employed" 
the "cat-out-of-the-bag" test, in conjunction with the "break-in-the­
stream-of-events" test.131 In Haas, "[p]roper police questioning, 
which elicited the defendant's later statements, was found to have 
followed the illegal interrogation closely without a discernible break 
in time or the stream of events 'sufficient to insulate the latter state­
ments from the events which went before."'132 The court concluded 
that neither test availed defendant Watkins: his later statements 
substantially differed from his earlier remarks, and, thus, the cat 
was not out of the bag; and the second statements were made only 
after the defendant had been afforded an opportunity to confer 
with counsel, breaking the stream of everits.133 
In Haas and Watkins, the trial judges had found, and the SJC 
affirmed, that the defendants'. statements were voluntary, despite 
the Miranda violations.134 The court, however, did not articulate its 
rationale for extending traditional voiuntaiiness analyses to Mi­
randa questions in those cases. The court apparently concluded 
that a Miranda violation, creating a technical presumption of ·coer­
cion,but not a finding of actual coercion, rionetheless impacted the 
voluntariness of the later, warned statemerit.135 Yet, in deciding 
that the defendant's later statement must be suppressed, the Haas 
128. [d. at 480-81, 379 N.E.2d at 1046. 
129. See id. at 481, 379 N.E.2d at 1046. 
130. See id. 
131. [d. 
132. [d. at 481-82, 379 N.E.2d at 1046 (quoting Commonwealth v. Haas, 373 
Mass. 545, 554, 369 N.E.2d 692, 699 (1977». The Watkins court apparently interpreted 
Haas as a "break-in-the-stream-of-events" case, not a "cat-out-of-the-bag" case. 
133. See id. at 482, 379 N.E.2d at 1046-47. Finally, the court concluded thai the 
Mosley requisites had been satisfied. See id. at 483-84,379 N.E.2d at 1047-48; see also 
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1981) (distinguishing the right to counsel 
from the right to remain silent but declining to create a per se ban on further question­
ing once a defendant has requested counsel). The SJC analogized the right to remain 
silent, discussed in Mosley, to the right to counsel. See Watkins, 375 Mass. at 483-84, 
379 N.E.2d at 1047-48. 
134. See Watkins, 375 Mass. at 481, 379 N.E.2d at 1046; Haas, 373 Mass. at 549 
n.4, 554 n.8, 369 N.E.2d at 696 n.4, 699 n.8. 
135. Other jurisdictions have also employed this analysis to assess the impact of 
Miranda violations on later, warned statements. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 699 
F.2d 466, 468-69 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Nash, 563 F.2d 1166, 1169 (5th Cir. 
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court did not expressly find that the defendant's will had been over­
borne by any knowledge that his initial, unwarned statement incul­
pated him. No aCtual compulsion of either statement manifested 
itself in the record. Even under a traditional voluntariness analysis, 
an initial coercive act does not taint all that comes after it.136 To 
require its suppression under a traditional voluntariness test, the 
second statement must be a product of the first. As no traditional 
element of involuntariness presented itself in Haas, the application 
of the "break-in-the-stream-of-events" and "cat-out-of-the-bag" 
tests in that case should not necessarily have mandated suppression 
of the defendant's second statement. By joining the traditional vol­
untariness tests with Miranda's per serule of exclusion, the SJC had 
fashioned a test which could bar from evidence voluntary properly 
warned statements. 
Ill. ELSTAD 
In Elstad, theUnited States Supreme Court squarely faced the 
question "whether an initial failure of law enforcement officers to 
administer the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona ..., with- . 
out more, 'taints' subsequent admissions made !lfter a suspect has 
been fully advised of and has waived his Miranda rightS."137 De­
fendant Elstad, age eight yen, was suspected of burglarizing a neigh­
bor's house.138· Police officers went to his home bearing a warrant 
for his arrest and spoke with his mother, who led them to the de­
fendant's room.139 The police officers asked the defendant, clad in 
shorts, to dress and proceed to the living room.140 One police of­
ficer then spoke to the defendant's mother in the kitchen, explain­
ing that they had a warrant to arrest her son.141 
The second police officer remained with the defendant, asked 
him whether he knew the reason for the visit, and inquired whether 
he knew the victim.142 The defendant said yes, noting that he heard 
that there had been a robbery at the neighbor's home.143 The po­
1977); see also infra note 200 and accompanying text (stating that the police may not 
intentionally withhold Miranda warnings until the suspect has incriminated himself). 
136. See United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1947); Commonwealth v. 
Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 682, 335 N.E.2d 660, 673 (1975). 
137. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 300 (1984) (citation omitted). 
138. See id. 
139. See id. 
140. See id. 
141. See id. at 300-01. 
142. See id. at 301. 
143. See id. 
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lice officer told the defendant that he suspected his involvement in 
the crime, and the defendant responded, "Yes, 1 was there."144 
The police officers then took the defendant to their cruiser; the 
defendant's father arrived home, and the police officers told him 
that the defendant was a burglary suspect.145 The defendant's fa­
ther, very agitated, said, "'I told you that you were going to get into 
trouble. You wouldn't listen to me. You never learn."'146 
Police officers interrogated the defendant at the police station 
approximately one hour later, after administering the Miranda 
warnings to him.147 The defendant acknowledged that he under­
stood the rights, agreed to speak with the police officers, and gave 
an incriminating statement.148 
At the trial for the burglary charge, the defendant alleged that 
the cat had been let out of the bag; he also said that the confession 
was the fruit of the poisonous tree.149 The trial judge excluded the 
defendant's initial statement that he had been present at the crime 
scene, because the defendant had not received the Miranda warn­
ings.150 He, however, found that the second statement, uttered at 
the police station, was voluntarily made after receipt of the warn­
ings and allowed it into evidence.151 
On appeal before the Oregon Court of Appeals, the govern­
ment conceded that the defendant had been in custody in his home, 
necessitating the Miranda warnings and requiring suppression of 
that statement.152 The appellate court found that the subsequent 
warned statement did not follow a break in the stream of events, 
mandating reversal of the defendant's conviction.153 The Oregon 
Supreme Court declined further review, and the case came before 
the United States Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari.154 
The Elstad Court reviewed the evolution of Miranda, noting 
144. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
145. See id. 
146. Id. 
147. See id. 
148. See id. 
149. See id. at 302 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963»; see 
also United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1947) ("[A]fter an accused has once let 
the cat out of the bag[,] ... [h]e can never get the cat back in the bag."). 
150. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 302. 
151. See id. 
152. See id.; see also State v. Elstad, 658 P.2d 552 (1983), rev'd sub nom. Oregon 
v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
153. See Elstad, 658 P.2d at 554. The court found that the cat was out of the bag. 
See id. at 555. 
154. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 303 n.3. 
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that, before that decision, the admissibility of a confession turned 
on the Fourteenth Amendment question of voluntariness.155 As 
Miranda created a presumption that custodial statements made 
without the warnings were coerced, due to the inherent coercive­
ness of custodial interrogation, it "required suppression of many 
statements that would have been admissible under traditional due 
process analysis ...."156 Therefore, a voluntary statement, if the 
product of a custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda, must 
be suppressed under the Fifth Amendment even though it would be 
admissible under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Court rejected the fruit of the poisonous tree analysis, 
finding it applicable only to violations of the Fourth Amendment.157 . 
In contrast, while the Miranda presumption of coerciveness is ir­
rebuttable as per the statement obtained in violation of its precepts, 
its fruits need not be "discarded as inherently tainted."158 The 
Court explained that the warnings are not themselves part of the 
Fifth Amendment, but serve only to protect a suspect's self-incrimi­
nation right.159 
The Miranda exclusionary rule ... serves the Fifth Amendment 
and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself.... 
The Fifth Amendment prohibits use by the prosecution in its case 
in chief only of compelled testimony. Failure to administer Mi­
randa warnings creates a presumption of compulsion. Conse­
quently, unwarned statements that are otherwise voluntary 
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment must nevertheless 
be excluded from evidence under Miranda. Thus, in the individ­
ual case, Miranda's preventive medicine provides a remedy even 
to the defendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional 
harm.l60 
The Court concluded that, absent actual coercion, a Miranda viola­
tion need not bar the admission in evidence of a subsequent, prop­
155. See id. at 303; see also supra notes 41-43, 64-70 and accompanying text. 
156. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 303. 
157. See id. at 305-06; see also supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
158. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307. 
159. See id. at 305. The" 'fruit of the poisonous tree' [test] assumes ... a constitu· 
tional violation." [d. The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule thus exists to deter 
unlawful searches, regardless of their fruits. See id. at 306. The exclusionary rule in the 
Fifth Amendment, however, is distinct from the one under the Fourth Amendment. See 
id. "Where a Fourth Amendment violation 'taints' the confession, a finding of volunta­
riness for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment is merely a threshold requirement in 
determining whether the confession was ... caused by the Fourth Amendment viola· 
tion." [d. (citing Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690 (1982». 
160. [d. at 306-07. 
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erly warned statement.161 
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the majority, noted 
that: 
the task of defining "custody" is a slippery one, and "policemen 
investigating serious crimes [cannot realistically be expected to] 
make no errors whatsoever." ... If errors are made by law en­
forcement officers in administering the prophylactic Miranda 
procedures, they should not breed the same irremediable conse­
quences as police infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself. It 
is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple fail­
ure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual co­
ercion or other circumstances. calculated to undermine the 
suspect's ability to exercise his free will, so taints the investigatory 
process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is inef­
fective for some indeterminate period. Though Miranda requires 
that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibil­
ity of any subsequent statement should tum in these circum­
stances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made .162 
A police officer's error in judgment is not tantamount to deliberate 
coercion, which offends due process and renders the reliability of 
the detainee's statement suspect. The Court decided that a second, 
prop~rly warned statement need not be subject to automatic exclu­
sion: "[T]here is no warrant for presuming coercive effect where 
the suspect's initial inculpatory statement, though technically in vio­
lation of Miranda, was voluntary. The relevant inquiry is whether, 
in fact, the second statement was also voluntarily made."163 In re­
jecting the concept of a presumptive taint, the Supreme' Court thus 
returned the focus to the suspect's actual mental state. . 
The Elstad Court declared the "cat-out-of-the-bag'" and 
"break-in-the-stream-of~events" metaphors inapt, as they apply to 
the question of voluntariness, not the technical coercion implicit in 
a Miranda violation.164 The metaphoric tests should be employed 
to assess the voluntariness of later statements made after an initial, 
involuntary one. 
161. See id. at 308-09. The Court extended Michigan v. Tucker, 414 U.S. 433 
(1974), which declined to suppress the testimony o~ a witness whose identity was discov­
ered through a statement made in violation of Miranda, see id. at 445-46, to a defend­
ant's own voluntary statement after a noncoercive Miranda violation, see Elstad, 470 
U.S. at 308-09. 
162. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Tucker, 417 U.S. at 446). 
163. Id. at 318 (emphasis added). 
164. See id. at 310-12. 
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Considering the "break-in-the-stream-of-events" analysis, the 
Court noted that, "of the courts· that have considered whether a 
properly warned confession must be suppressed because it was pre­
ceded by an unwarned but clearly voluntary admission, the majority 
have explicitly or implicitly recognized that [the] requirement of a 
break in the stream of events is inapposite. "165 The Court con­
cluded that administration of the Miranda warnings will cure the 
error, for "[t]he warning conveys the relevant information and 
thereafter ,the suspect's choice whether to exercise his privilege to 
remain silent should ordinarily be viewed as an 'act of free will."'l66 
That is, the invocation of the Miranda warnings should be sufficient 
to terminate the taint of the initial Miranda violation. 
As for the "cat-out-of-the-bag" analysis, the Court held that its 
application to Miranda breaches would "disable" law enforcement, 
where the cat's emergence from the bag was due to the suspect's 
own act, not any actual law enforcement coercion.167 It stated: 
This Court has never held that the psychological impact of volun­
tary disclosure of a guilty secret qualifies as state compulsion or 
compromises the voluntariness of a subsequent informed 
. waiver .... [A]dopt[ion of] this expansive view of Fifth Amend­
ment compulsion, effectively immunizes a suspect who responds 
to pre-Miranda warning questions from the consequences of his 
subsequent . informed waiver of the priviiege of remaining 
silent.168 . 
The Court accurately repositioned the "cat-out-of-the-bag" ques­
tion into the context of coercion by law enforcement agents.169 
The Court concluded that an initial, voluntary statement made 
in violation of Miranda must be suppressed, but the admissibility of 
a subsequent, warned confession hinges upon the question whether 
it also was voluntarily made.170 The Court said: 
165. Id. at 310 & n.2. Interestingly, the Court cited Commonwealth v. White, 353 
Mass. 409,232 N.E.2d 335 (1967), as one such decision. In White, the SJC had rejected 
the defendant's suggestion that one illegally obtained statement presumptively tainted 
any subsequent statement, noting that the question of the admissibility in evidence of 
the subsequent statement turns on the question whether the defendant made it volunta­
rily. See id. at 417, 232N.E.2d at 341. The Haas court did not cite White. 
166. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 311 (quoting Wong .Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 
486 (1963». . 
167. [d.; see also supra notes 69-70. 
168. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 312 (emphasis added). 
169. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text (providing examples of cases 
involving voluntary statements by the defendant, and statements obtained through co­
ercion by private citizens). 
170. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 317-18. 
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subsequent administration of the Miranda warnings to a suspect 
who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily 
should suffice to. remove the conditions that precluded admission 
of the earlier statement. In such circumstances, the finder of fact 
may reasonably conclude that the suspect made a rational and in­
telligent choice whether to waive or invoke his rights.171 
The admissibility of the second statement is decided by review­
ing the totality of the circumstances: "[T]he finder of fact must ex­
amine the surrounding circumstances and the entire course of 
police conduct with respect to the suspect in evaluating the volunta­
riness of his statements. The fact that a suspect chooses to speak 
after being informed of his rights is, of course, highly probative."I72 
Examining the totality of circumstances surrounding Elstad's 
questioning, the Court deemed "the causal connection between any 
psychological disadvantage created by [Elstad's first] admission and 
his ultimate decision to cooperate ... speculative and attenuated at 
best."173 Elstad's second statement, wholly voluntary, was admissi­
ble in evidence against him.174 The Elstad Court thus separated the 
Fifth Amendment Miranda exclusionary rule from the Fourteenth 
Amendment tests for voluntariness, as blended by Haas and 
Watkins. 
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., in a dissent to which Justice 
Thurgood Marshall joined, proclaimed that Elstad delivered a "po­
tentially crippling blow" to Miranda. 175 He protested the denuding 
of the" 'fruit of the poisonous tree'" test.176 Justice Brennan's con­
cerns may pose some credence. If review of the voluntariness of 
the second, properly warned statement after an initial Miranda vio­
lation does not allow consideration of the first statement's impact 
on the suspect's decision to make the second, then the "totality of 
the circumstances" are not examined. Indeed, other courts have 
summarily rejected the defendants' "cat-out-of-the-bag" claims, cit­
ing Elstad. l77 But the second statement may be the fruit of the Mi­
171. Id. at 314 (emphasis added). 
172. Id. at 318. 
173. Id. at 313-14 (emphasis added). 
174. See id. at 318. 
175. Id. at 319 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
176. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
177. See, e.g., Bryant v. Vose, 785 F.2d 364, 367 n.3 (1st Cir. 1986) (the defendant 
claimed that his second statement was a fruit of the first, but, as the defendant did not 
claim that second confession was elicited under pressure, and the record disclosed no 
such pressure, the second statement was admissible in evidence); Martin v. Wainwright, 
770 F.2d 918, 928-29 (11th Cir. 1985) (as the police officers did not use "physical vio­
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randa violation if the suspect believes that, in making the first 
statement, he has "spilled the beans" and therefore has nothing to 
lose by continuing to speak. By making the exclusive source of the 
first statement the suspect's own guilty conscience, and by ignoring 
the import of the first, unwarned statement on the suspect's frame 
of mind in making the second, warned one, the Elstad Court argu­
ably begs the question of voluntariness.178 
Further, Justice Brennan suggested that police officers might 
withhold provision of the Miranda warnings until they gain a con­
fession and only then belatedly administer the Miranda warnings.179 
In United States v. Carter,180 however, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit faced such a scenario and found that 
Elstad "did not go so far as to fashion a rule permitting this sort of 
end run around Miranda."181 The law enforcement agents in Carter 
clearly knew that the defendant was in custody; their failure to ad­
minister the Miranda warning therefore could not be interpreted as 
a good-faith mistake.182 The Carter court concluded that the de­
fendant's second statement must be suppressed.183 Elstad thus does 
not allow police officers to ignore, or manipulate, Miranda. 
IV. MASSACHUSETIS' DEFEcrION FROM ELSTAD 
The SJC considered Elstad's application in Commonwealth v. 
Smith.184 Like Justice Brennan, the SJC apparently was troubled 
by Elstad. 
Defendant Smith and his friend Duclos were suspected of hav­
ing executed Duclos's parents by rifle fire.185 Duclos and his 
mother had quarreled over the proceeds of an insurance policy, and 
Smith had disliked the woman since she prevented him from taking 
lence" or "other deliberate means" to elicit the first, unwarned statement, the failure to 
timely give the Miranda warnings did not "automatically require the exclusion of the 
[later, warned] confession"). 
178. Indeed, finding police officers "ill-equipped to pinch-hit for counsel," the 
Court declared that the suspect need not be apprised that the first statement must be 
suppressed due to the Miranda violation, when electing whether to waive his self-in­
crimination rights. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 316. The Court noted that it "has never em­
braced the theory that a defendant's ignorance of the full consequences of his decisions 
vitiates their voluntariness." Id. 
179. See id. at 318 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
180. 884 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1989). 
181. Id. at 373. 
182. See id. 
183. See id. at 375. 
184. 412 Mass. 823, 829, 593 N.E.2d 1288, 1291 (1992). 
185. See id. at 824-25, 593 N.E.2d at 1289. 
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a gun and shooting his own mother.186 
Duclos reported the fatal shootings to his grandmother, who 
summoned the police department.187 Police officers found the vic­
tims' bodies and asked Duclos to come to the police station.188 Du­
clos complied and initially named the defendant as an alibi witness, 
contending that the two had been" 'four-wheeling'" in his truck at 
the time of the murders.189 After a police officer spotted blood 
spatters on Duclos's socks, Duclos acknowledged his involvement 
in the crime, but said that the defendant Smith fired the fatal 
shotS.190 
Armed with Duclos' admissions, the police officers questioned 
defendant Smith at the police station without administering the Mi­
randa warnings to him.191 The defendant confirmed Duclos's initial 
alibi that the two had been '''4 wheeling.'''192 One police officer 
ultimately administered the Miranda warnings to the defendant, 
told the defendant that he did not believe him, and informed him 
that Duclos had implicated him in the murders.193 The defendant 
then admitted his participation in the effort to conceal the crime, 
denied that he fired the fatal shots, and impliedly claimed that Du­
clos had killed his own parents.194 
The trial judge suppressed the defendant's initial statements, 
finding a Miranda violation, but allowed the later, warned admis­
sions into evidence.195 On appeal from his first-degree murder con­
victions, the defendant challenged that ruling.196 
The SJC flatly rejected Elstad and instead followed a line of 
pre-Elstad precedent perceiving· a presumptive taint of an initial 
Miranda violation on later, warned statements.197 The court traced 
186. See id. at 824-25, 824 n.1, 593 N.E.2d at 1289 & n.l. 
187. See id. at 825, 593 N.E.2d at 1289. 
188. See id. 
189. Id. at 826, 593 N.E.2d at 1290. 
190. See id. 
191. See id. at 827, 593 N.E.2d at 1290. 
192. See id., 593 N.E.2d at 1291. 
193. See id. at 828, 593 N.E.2d at 1291. 
194. See id. 
195. See id. at 829, 593 N.E.2d at 1291. 
196. See id. at 825, 593 N.E.2d at 1289. 
197. See id. at 829-30, 593 N.E.2d at 1291-92. Those cases, which included Haas 
as well as decisions of some other federal and state courts, were decided before Elstad, 
and therefore were not controlling or persuasive authority. While other jurisdictions 
previously applied the Fourteenth Amendment voluntariness tests to determine 
whether a Miranda violation should result in the suppression of later statements, see, 
e.g., United States v. Lee, 699 F.2d 466, 468-69 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Nash, 
563 F.2d 1166, 1169 (5th Cir. 1977), the Elstad Court corrected that error. See Elstad, 
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the history of federal constitutional law prior to Elstad and con­
tended that a Miranda violation presumptively tainted any subse­
quent confession by an accused.198 The court focused on both the 
"break -in-the-stream -of-events" and "cat-out -of -the-bag" tests.199 
The Smith court explained that the presumed taint 
was intended to deter law enforcement officials from circum­
venting the Miranda requirements by using the warnings strategi­
cally-first questioning a suspect without benefit of the warnings, 
and then, having obtained an incriminating response or having 
otherwise benefited from the coercive atmosphere, by giving the 
Miranda warnings and questioning the suspect again in order to 
obtain an admissible statement.2oo 
The court concluded that the "presumption of taint is also consis­
tent with the constitutional principle that the government bears the 
burden to show that a defendant's custodial statement was freely 
willed."201 The SJC held to its view that an initial Miranda breach 
affects the voluntariness of any later statement.202 This holdiJ1g is in 
complete conflict with Elstad. 
The court then discussed the "break-in-the-stream-of-events" 
and the "cat-out-of-the-bag" tests, explaining that the. first test 
looked to whether external constraints, old or new, overbore the 
defendant's will, while the latter test looked to whether the subse­
quent statement was a product of the suspect's conclusion that he 
had let the secret out for good in his earlier statement.203 The court 
alluded to Haas and lfatkins, saying that defendant Haas had let 
the cat out of the bag during initial questioning and his later, 
warned statement followed so closely on the illegal interrogation 
that there had been no break in the chain of events, and noting that 
defendant Watkins had not made an inculpatory statement in his 
470 U.S. 298, 317-18 (1985). That other courts previously applied the Fourteenth 
Amendment tests to Miranda violations demonstrates that Massachusetts was not alone 
in its misinterpretation of federal precedent before Elstad, but nonetheless gives no 
validity to the SIC's rejection of Elstad once the Supreme Court had clarified the disc 
tinction between Miranda and voluntariness questions. 
198. See Smith, 412 Mass. at 829; 593 N.E.2d at 1291-92. 
199. See id. at 830, 593 N.E.2d at 1292. . 
200. Id. at 829, 593 N.E.2d at 1292. But see United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 
373, 375 (8th Cir. 1989) (concluding that ELStad did not allow police officers to inten­
tionally withhold the Miranda warnings until a suspect incriminated himself,' only then 
to administer them). 
201. Smith, 412 Mass. at 829-30, 593 N.E.2d at 1292. 
202. See id. at 830, 593 N.E.2d at 1292 (quoting Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 
Mass. 662,682,335 N.E.2d 660, 673 (1975». " .' . 
203. See id. at 830-31, 593 N.E.2d at 1292. 
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first interrogation, so the cat was not out of the bag, and his second 
statement had been temporally removed from the initial 
questioning.204 
The court then turned to Elstad, which had rejected the notion 
of the presumptive taint.205 The trial judge had concluded that 
Smith was not subjected to any pressure, was not under the influ­
ence of alcohol or drugs, and was willing to speak with the police 
officers.206 The court concluded: "This evidence supports the 
judge's ultimate finding that the defendant's statements were volun­
tary and, therefore, that his second statement would be admissible as 
a matter o/present Federal constitutionallaw."207 Under Elstad, this 
should have ended the court's inquiry. 
But the Smith court, as the defendant urged, applied Haas to 
the case. Although the trial judge had not applied the "break-in­
the-stream-of-events" test, the Smith court concluded that no break 
had occurred, as the defendant was subjected to a single, continu­
ous interrogation.2og Further, although the trial judge concluded 
that the "cat-out-of-the-bag" test, as in Watkins, did not apply be­
cause the defendant had not implicated himself in his first state­
ment, the court deemed that holding "clearly erroneous," for .the 
defendant let the proverbial cat out of the bag by reciting Duclos's 
alibi, which the police officers then knew to be false.209 As in Haas, 
however, it appears that, while the police officers knew that the de­
fendant made a fatal slip, the defendant did not.2l0 He was una­
ware that the cat was out of the bag; therefore, the second 
statement was not triggered by the first. To the contrary, the court 
said that the "defendant may have believed, mistakenly, that his 
204. See id. at 831, 593 N.E.2d at 1292-93. 
205. See id. at 832, 593 N.E.2d at 1293. 
206. See id. 
207. Id. (emphasis added). 
208. See id. 
209. Id. at 835, 593 N.E.2d at 1295. The court, however, rejected the prosecu­
tion's contention that the case was akin to Watkins, because Smith's initial statement-a 
false alibi planned with Duc1os--exhibited consciousness of guilt and, thus, was much 
more inculpatory than Watkins's statements. See id. at 834 & n.lO, 593 N.E.2d at 1294 
& n.l0. The court said that "[t]he first statement, if available to the prosecution, would 
have constituted strong evidence of consciousness of guilt." Id. at 834, 593 N.E.2d at 
1294. The first statement, however, was not available to the Commonwealth because it 
was made absent provision of the Miranda warnings and therefore was suppressed. See 
id. at 829, 593 N.E.2d at 1291. There is no evidence demonstrating that the defendant 
knew he had inculpated himself with the first statement; to the contrary, the appellate 
court mentioned the interrogating police officer's omission of the details of Duc1os's 
statement when he questioned the defendant. See id. at 828 n.6, 593 N.E.2d at 1291 n.6. 
210. See id. at 835, 593 N.E.2d at 1294-95. 
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statement was exculpatory_"211 Since the police officers knew that 
the defendant had incriminated himself, the court held that they 
were obligated to create a break in the chain of events to insulate 
the defendant's statement from the earlier illegality.212 The court, 
therefore, declared Smith's second statement inadmissible in 
evidence.213 
As a "common-law rule of evidence," the Smith court con­
cluded that it "shall, in a situation where Federal law requires Mi
randa protections, continue to follow the principles set forth in 
Commonwealth v. Haas."214 The court also resurrected the concept 
of presumptive taint eliminated by Elstad.215 The court considered 
its rule a boon to criminal trials, for it would eliminate "fact-bound 
inquiries into the voluntariness of confessions, where police officers 
are generally more credible witnesses than criminal defendants. "216 
Yet, as Justice Braucher noted in his Haas concurrence, application 
of a rigid exclusionary rule, without regard for the particular facts 
of the case, can result in arbitrary rulings.217 Further, the court im­
plicitly rejected Elstad's call for a review of the totality of the cir­
cumstances to determine whether the second, warned statement is 
voluntary. This per se rule of exclusion also is a departure from 
Bayer and Mahnke, which focused on the question whether, in light 
of the circumstances, the second statement was tainted by the 
first.218 Finally, Smith's statements were found to be voluntary, 
making their suppression from evidence akin to a per se rule of 
exclusion.219 
In a footnote, the SJC acknowledged that the "cat-out-of-the­
bag" and the "break-in-the-stream-of-events" tests are distinct, but 
declined to discuss their relationship.22O The court also rejected the 
prosecution's contention that, since the defendant had not incrimi­
nated himself in his first statement, the "break-in-the-stream-of­
events" test did not require suppression.221 It posited that the test 
211. Id. at 835, 593 N.E.2d at 1295. 
212. See id. 
213. See id. 
214. Id. at 837, 593 N.E.2d at 1296. 
215. See id. at 836, 593 N.E.2d at 1295. 
216. [d. at 837, 593 N.E.2d at 1296. 
217. See Commonwealth v. Haas, 373 Mass. 545, 564-65, 369 N.E.2d 692-705 
(1977). 
218. See United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1947); Commonwealth v. 
Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 676, 686, 335 N.E.2d 666, 669, 675 (1975). 
219. See Smith, 373 Mass. at 832, 593 N.E.2d at 1293. 
220. See id. at 833-34, 833 n.9, 593 N.E.2d at 1293-94, 1293 n.9. 
221. See id. at 835, 593 N.E.2d at 1294-95. 
206 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:173 
could require suppression of a later, incriminating statement in 
some instances, suggesting that a technical violation of Miranda, 
absent coercion or an incriminating statement, might create a per se 
rule of exclusion for all subsequent statements.222 This is precisely 
the immunity that Elstad tried to prevent.223 
The Smith court then adopted Haas as "a common-law rule of 
evidence."224 The SJC, however, neglected to adopt the Miranda 
warnings themselves under the state law. Further, the protection 
against self-incrimination has no history in Massachusetts common 
law, bu~ exists in Article Twelve of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights.225 The court's application of tests rejected by the 
Supreme Court to determine the consequences of a violation of the 
federal Miranda warnings thus was not a legitimate exercise of its 
power to create and define state law. Rather, it was an affront to 
the concept of federalism.226 Justice Joseph R. Nolan, dissenting, 
spoke plainly and succinctly: 
The rule of ... Elstad . .. should be followed. There, the United 
States Supreme Court correctly left to the fact finder the only 
crucial question, whether the suspect made a rational and intelli­
gerit choice either to waive or invoke his rights after Miranda, 
warnings had been given. I dissent.227 
In his view, as the Supreme Court had established a rule, the SJC 
was bound to apply it to the facts of the case before it. 
If provision of the Miranda warnings, creatures of federal con­
stitutional law, are required under federal constitutional analysis, 
222. The defendant, eighteen years of age, had left high school without graduat­
ing. See id. at 824, 593 N.E.2d at 1289. The court contrasted the interrogating police 
officer's eighteen years of experience with the defendant's age. See id. at 827 nA, 593 
N.E.2d at 1290 nA. Unlike the Elstad Court, it is apparent that the Smith court focused 
on the police officer's state of mind. Although the Smith court noted the danger of 
p,olice officers manipulating the timing of Miranda warnings in order to procure an 
inculpatory statement, see id. at 829, 593 N,E.2d at 1292, the court did not expressly find 
that the law enforcement agents here had so manipulated Smith. Had the court made 
such a finding, it could have suppressed the statements under United States v. Carter, 
884 F.2d 368, 373, 375 (8th Cir. 1989), without rejecting Elstad and fashioning a state 
rule. 
223. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 312 (1985). 
224. Smith, 412 Mass. at 837, 593 N.E.2d at 1296. 
225. See MASS. CONST. art. XII ("No subject shall be ... compelled to accuse, or 
furnish evidence against himself, ..."); Commonwealth v. Zevitas, 418 Mass. 677, 682, 
639 N.E.2d 1076, 1078 (1994); Opinions of the Justices, 412 Mass. 1201, 1206, 591 
N.E.2d 1073, 1075 (1992). 
226. See supra notes 3-4. 
227. Smith, 412 Mass. at 838, 593 N.E.2d at 1296 (Nolan, J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted). 
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then the SJC cannot apply a state-devised test for exclusion of evi­
dence produced after the Miranda violation, but must apply the 
federal test. The Supreme Court devised an exclusionary rule in 
Miranda and defined its scope in Elstad. The legal justification for 
the SJC's devising of its own rule under state "common law" is 
highly suspect. The state court simply flouted the Supreme Court's 
authority. 
While Elstad raises some concerns, it is a decision of the 
United States Supreme Court. The SJC has not adopted the Mi­
randa warnings as part of Article Twelve.228 If, as is apparent, the 
court did not approve of Elstad's rejection of the "cat-out-of-the­
bag" and the "break-in-the-stream-of-events" tests, it nonetheless 
should not have devised a state common-law rule of exclusion to 
replace that enunciated by the Elstad Court. Rather, the court 
should have embraced the Miranda warnings under Article Twelve. 
It then would be free to devise a state exclusionary rule for a state 
constitutional violation. That rule then would rest wholly within 
state law and would be completely legitimate. . 
Since Smith, the SJC has adhered to its two-test stance without 
explaining why two tests are necessary and which applies to a given 
case.229 The court also has continued in its application of the "cat­
out-of-the-bag" test without examining the impact of an initia,l, un­
warned statement on the defendant's actual state of mind when 
electing to make a subsequent statement upon receipt of the Mi
randa warnings~230 This eliminates the traditional finding of actual 
228. See supra note 29 and the accompanying text. 
229. See Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 792, 799-800, 800 n.8, 678 N.E.2d 
847, 852 & n.8 (1997) (reciting tests and noting, without explaining, that the question 
whether one or both applies is determined by the facts of the case); Commonwealth v. 
Damiano, 422 Mass. 10, 13, 660 N.E.2d 660, 662 (1996) (briefly reciting both tests and 
affirming trial judge's conclusion that both tests were satisfied); Commonwealth v. 
Prater, 420 Mass. 569, 580-84, 580 n.lO, 651 N.E.2d 833, 840-42, 840 n.lO (1995) (holding 
that either or both tests apply, depending on the facts of the case); Commonwealth v. 
Osachuk, 418 Mass. 229, 235-37, 635 N.E.2d 1192, 1195-96 (1994) (applying both tests 
and concluding that the cat was out of the bag and that there was no break in the stream 
of events). 
230. See Damiano, 422 Mass. at 11, 13, 660 N.E.2d at 662 (where a cabdriver was 
found dead in the middle of a highway and the defendant had been observed running 
about, scantily clad, and acting irrationally, the court found that the initial Miranda 
violation required suppression of the second, warned statement; the court concluded 
that the unwarned statement was incriminating as it placed the defendant at the homi­
cide scene, but the court did not expressly examine the impact of the first statement on 
the defendant's state of mind when making the second); Osachuk, 418 Mass. at 236-37, 
635 N.E.2d at 1196-97 (focusing on the incriminating nature of the defendant's initial, 
unwamed statement, not his state of mind). But see Prater, 420 Mass. at 583, 651 
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coercion from the test. Further, the court's suggestion that a Mi­
randa violation that does not produce an incriminating statement 
might require suppression of a later, warned statement if there is no 
break in the stream of events hints of the per se rule of exclusion 
which the Elstad Court took measures to guard against. Apart 
from its arbitrariness, the court's undermining of the concept of 
federalism is particularly troubling, since the .court has available, 
and has not hesitated to employ in other cases,231 the state 
constitution.232 
CONCLUSION 
Regardless of one's opinion as to the soundness of the United 
States Supreme Court's reasoning in Elstad, the decision nonethe­
N.E.2d at 842 ('" A principal reason why a suspect might make a second or third confes­
sion is simply that ... he might think he has little to lose by repetition."') (quoting 
Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346, 350-51 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dis­
senting in part) (alteration in original)); Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 687, 
335 N.E.2d 660, 675-76 (1975) (finding no cat out of the bag because the defendant did 
not feel that he had damned himself by his earlier statement). 
231. See supra note 23 and cases cited for examples. 
232. Also unsettling is the court's failure to articulate the basis within state law 
for its new rule. The court has acted arbitrarily on other occasions, often adopting a 
rejected federal test in the wake of a new federal decision. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Stoute, 422 Mass. 782, 785-89, 665 N.E.2d 93, 95-98 (1992) (rejecting California v. 
Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), as the definition for a "stop," and adopting Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), tests no 
longer viable after Hodari D., under Article Fourteen); Commonwealth v. Amendola, 
406 Mass. 592, 599-600, 599 n.3, 550 N.E.2d 121, 125 & n.3 (1990) (noting only that 
Article Fourteen of the state constitution sometimes confers more protections than 
does the Fourth Amendment, the court decided that the United States Supreme Court's 
reasoning in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), was more compelling than that 
in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980), which had overruled Jones's automatic 
standing rule as no longer necessary, and adopted a rule of automatic standing under 
Article Fourteen). The court's predilection for resurrecting outmoded federal law has 
left criminal practitioners and the state's intermediate Massachusetts Appeals Court in 
limbo, requiring practitioners and the intermediate court to apply both old and new 
federal analyses to a settled federal question in anticipation of the SJC's possible devia­
tion from the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 420 Mass. 458, 462­
66,650 N.E.2d 1257, 1259-62 (1995) (stating that for nearly twenty years, Appeals Court 
followed Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977), on the question of undue sugges­
tiveness of identification procedures, while the SJC adhered to Commonwealth v. 
Botelho, 369 Mass. 860, 343 N.E.2d 876 (1976)). In Johnson, the SJC finally embraced 
Botelho under Article 1Welve of the state constitution); Commonwealth v. Harkess, 35 
Mass. App. Ct. 26, 629 & n.l, 624 N.E.2d 581, 584 & n.l (1993) (applying both Terry­
Mendenhall and Hodari D. analyses, while noting that it was up to the SJC to deter­
mine what was the proper test under Article Fourteen). As the SJC often does not 
explain the historical basis for finding state constitutional or common-law rules more 
protective than federal tests, practitioners and lower courts must divine whether, and 
how, the court will depart from federal law. 
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less is a statement from the nation's highest Court concerning a 
principle of federal constitutional law and its application. The Mas­
sachusetts SJC, dissatisfied with the Elstad rule, was free as a mat­
ter of state constitutional or common law to adopt the Miranda 
warnings and to administer any test of its own devising to assess the 
consequences of their violation. Since the state self-incrimination 
right exists within Article Twelve, the state constitution would have 
been the proper vehicle for adoption of the Miranda warnings. In­
stead, the court created common-law "adjuncts" to Miranda with­
out adopting the whole to which they attach. 
Further, when applying Fourteenth Amendment voluntariness 
tests, which focus on actual coercion, to a Miranda, Fifth Amend­
ment violation, the SJC has removed the analyses' subjective com­
ponent. If there is no break in the stream of events, even if a 
suspect has not incriminated himself, later, properly warned state­
ments nonetheless may be suppressed. Similarly, if the police of­
ficers know, but the suspect is unaware, that the suspect has 
incriminated himself, then the cat is out of the bag. As the Elstad 
Court noted, requiring suppression of voluntary statements because 
of police officers' technical missteps, without any overbearing of the 
defendant's will, extends Miranda beyond the contemplated param­
eters of the Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule. 
